We argue that predictability (how well spending on certain services can be anticipated) and predictiveness (how well certain services contemporaneously co-vary with total health care spending) both matter for understanding adverse selection incentives. Three main points are made. First, the predictability of specific services rather than of total spending matters for problems of adverse selection. Second, it is generally what the plan (not the individual) predicts that matters, since it is the plan (not the individual) that chooses actions such as excluding applicants or distorting services, which create adverse selection. Third, among those services that are predictable, health plans have incentives to underprovide those that are positively correlated with total spending and overprovide those that are negatively correlated with total health spending.
Introduction
Uncertainty about future health care expenses is probably the largest risk faced by households in highincome countries and underlies the existence of private and public health insurance. Part of future health care spending, however, can be anticipated, both by the individuals involved and by the plans responsible for the financial costs of illness, interfering with the smooth functioning of insurance markets. As is well known, the predictability of some of health care spending can cause adverse selection problems. In the literature in health economics, "predictability" typically refers to how much of the variation in individual level spending can be explained using predetermined information. 1 We argue in this paper that the concept of "predictability" needs refinement, conceptually and empirically. Our paper makes three main points. First, for certain forms of risk selection, it is the predictability of spending on specific types of services rather than total spending that is important. Second, it is generally what the plan (not the individual) predicts that matters for problems of adverse selection, since it is the plan that may take actions that create adverse selection, such as excluding applicants or distorting the quality of services.
Third, in addition to predictability, a distinct concept of the "predictiveness" of health care spending is also an important source of adverse selection. By predictiveness we mean the degree to which spending on one service category is contemporaneously correlated with total spending.
We begin with a review of the literature on the topic of the predictability of health care expenditures. We next introduce our conceptual framework that makes the distinction between predictability and predictiveness. We next develop an analytical model that motivates why predictability and predictiveness together determine incentives for service level adverse selection. The framework is then implemented using national Medicare data for 1996 and 1997. Categories of services for which services are both predictable and predictive (either plus or minus) are particularly subject to distortionary incentives that contribute to adverse selection. A discussion of the implications for research on risk adjustment policy concludes the paper.
Studies of the Predictability of Health Care Spending
Early research on risk selection focused on what a health plan can predict about total health care costs, and how the plan might use this information to select enrollees. Feldman and Dowd (1982) assume that plans can accurately forecast potential enrollees' costs, and can perfectly select only those enrollees for whom the expected costs are less than the premium the plan is paid. 2 In their model, HMO enrollment is supply determined: all potential enrollees are assumed to seek enrollment, and the plan is able to choose the ones it accepts. The mechanism used by plans to actually achieve this selection are unspecified, an unsatisfying assumption in light of legal and ethical restrictions on these types of explicit dumping.
Because this literature focuses on the plan's decision to exclude individuals, and not on the plan's decision about the nature of its product, concerns about the predictability of individual services or the correlation of service costs with total costs do not emerge.
A related literature on predictability therefore has focused on total expenditures and explored what might be predictable from an empirical standpoint, ultimately for purposes of comparison with explained variance in risk adjustment formula. Newhouse et al. (1989) , van Vliet (1992) , Welch (1985) , McCall and Wai (1983) all regard "what is predictable" as a statistical problem, where there is an absolute standard defined by a true model that uses all available information from year 1 to predict total spending in year 2. An agent, the individual, HMO or regulator, might know some subset of the full set of variables and therefore be in a position to act on them. In this literature, what the consumer or the HMO actually use for predictions is not particularly important in defining the maximum predictable proportion of the variance.
There are some important differences in how the reasonable maximum is defined. Newhouse et al (1989) define the "maximum lower bound" predictable to be that predictable by the full set of time invariant individual characteristics. It is a maximum because it uses all the information in time invariant characteristics. It is a lower bound because it disregards information in the time varying characteristics that might be measurable and knowable. Van Vliet (1992) allows for the possibility of time-varying characteristics by incorporating autoregressive components of spending in his predictions. Welch (1985) employs a related idea in supposing that expenditures for any person in a year are in the process of regressing towards a mean for a person of that type. Papers using various data sets and making use of these assumptions conclude that the "predictable" component of variance is about 15-25%.
This framework gives a more hopeful view of existing risk adjustment formula. Instead of explaining one percent of the variance, a risk adjustment formula might be explaining "fifteen percent of the predictable variance." A series of papers have explored the importance of this degree of predictability and simulated 2 More recent examples along the same lines are Newhouse (1989) and Shen and Ellis (2002a, 2002b) .
HMO incentives to engage in selection ( Van Vliet, 1992; Newhouse, 1997; Shen and Ellis, 2002a) . They all find that risk adjustment reduces but does not eliminate the profitability of risk selection.
A third line of research relevant to the concepts of predictability and predictiveness was initiated in Glazer and McGuire (2000) who emphasize the importance of service level product distortions as a risk selection strategy. In their framework, the regulator chooses the risk adjustment formula using imperfect signals of health care costs, HMOs choose service levels so as to selectively ration quantities of each type of service, and consumers choose among HMOS in light of the offered levels of services. After taking account of risk adjustment, HMOs will have an incentive to overprovide services that are disproportionately used by profitable (healthy) people and undersupply services that are disproportionately used by unprofitable (chronically ill) people. In service level selection, it is plans actions seeking to determine who demands membership that are the source of adverse selection. It is recognized that plans must accept all applicants and must therefore effectuate selection by choice of the mix of "quality" of its services. The incentive to attract or deter potential enrollees based on profitability creates an inefficiency, the inefficiency risk adjustment can be designed to correct. Conventional risk adjustment, whereby health plans are paid for the incremental expected costs predicted by each signal, will reduce but not eliminate the incentive for this type of service-based risk selection. They define the concept of "Optimal Risk Adjustment," whereby the regulator solves for the efficient payment formula in light of the anticipated selection behavior of the plans and the information in the signals used to make payments. Frank, Glazer, and McGuire (2000) operationalize the Glazer and McGuire framework by deriving formulas for the profit-maximizing level of rationing by service for an HMO. Their formula demonstrates that it is the contemporaneous correlation of each service with total spending that determines the direction of incentives to over or under provide, and that predictability of each service is a necessary condition for service selection. They derive an expression for the profit maximizing level of service based on a shadow price for each type of service, and illustrate the formulas using a small sample of 16,000 Medicaid enrollees. They find evidence that spending on treatment for certain diagnoses are subject to service level product distortion, and that the information set used by individuals and plans to make predictions matters enormously. Two conventional risk adjustment models using diagnostic information that they evaluate significantly reduce the service distortion problem.
Evidence for service level selection in Medicare is presented in Cao and McGuire (2002) who examine the empirical relationship between service level spending and HMO market share in the Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) population. They find empirical evidence that spending patterns in the FFS sector does seem to reflect service level distortion, with Part A (hospital) spending on mental disorders, and Part B spending on psychiatry and general surgery showing the most significant impact of this service selection.
In another paper, demonstrates that service level spending by Medicare enrollees in the FFS sector is also predictive at the individual level of whether a person chooses to switch into an HMO. Hence it is rationale for Medicare HMOs to use service level product distortion strategies to selectively attract profitable enrollees.
This section has highlighted that the existing literature has identified the possibility and direction of service level product distortion by HMOs trying to attract a favorable group of enrollees. The empirical studies just reviewed has provided some indication of the services that may be most subject to service distortion, and have illustrated the importance of spending correlations, information sets, and risk adjustment models for selection incentives. In the next section we present a simple model that identifies the importance of predictability and predictiveness in determining selection incentives using data from a fee-for-service setting where the observed quantities of services are not the optimally chosen levels.
Model
This section presents a model that is very similar to the Frank Glazer and McGuire (2000) (FGM) model.
As in FGM, assume that there is a set of S health services being offered by a capitated health plan we call an HMO, competing against a FFS health plan. The HMO is assumed to choose shadow prices q s for each service so as to ration services and attract a profit maximizing set of enrollees. We normalize all of the shadow prices in the fee-for-service system, q s FFS , to be one, and are interested in whether the HMO has an incentive to increase or decrease its shadow prices q s HMO so as to maximize expected profits. As in Cao and McGuire (2002) , the health plan will be said to have an incentive to undersupply a particular service (raise its shadow price) if
Conversely, the plan will have an incentive to oversupply services relative to the FFS if the reverse inequality is true. 
∑ =
The HMO is assumed to receive a capitated payment for person i, r i , so that the actual profit to the HMO from person i is r i -M i . Finally, the probability that person i joins the HMO is assumed to depend on the consumers own expected levels of services, n[m (q) i ] .
Using this notation, we can write the plans expected profits as follows.
[ ]
As in FGM, we assume that individual preferences are additively separable in each service m is , which implies that for all i
Using this powerful simplifying assumption, we can write the derivative of plan expected profits with respect to rationing price q s as
In the second line of (3) we have defined the elasticities of m s and m s with respect to shadow prices as η s and η s , respectively. We assume that these two elasticities are constant across individuals.
Whereas FGM (2000) set this derivative equal to zero and solve for an expression for the profit maximizing level of q, we are interested here only in the simpler question of whether plans have an incentive to increase or decrease the shadow price for q relative to the FFS level, which we normalize to be one. This is equivalent to finding the sign of the above expression, evaluated at q s = 1. 
This final expression is the main result of our analytical model, and motivates our three propositions and empirical estimation. Recall that we are primarily interested in determining the sign and magnitude of this derivative, not with setting it equal to zero and solving for the optimal q s . Outside of the large brackets, note that m s is a scaling factor indicating that services with higher means matter more for profits, while η s , the elasticity of the marginal benefit function, is negative, and indicates that more highly elastic services will affect profits more. Whether expected profits are increased or decreased by raising the shadow prices depends on the sign of the terms inside of the large brackets.
The first term inside the large brackets is Φ s s n m = ∂ ∂ , the marginal effect of an increase in the expected spending on a service on the probability of individuals joining the health plan. FGM assume this to be constant across consumers for all services, which we do not need to here. Cao and McGuire (2002) provide evidence from HMO entry decisions that these -s terms vary systematically across services. We do not contribute to understanding the importance of these terms, other than to note that in almost all cases we expect that offering more services is good so the -s should all be positive. 5 We maintain that assumption for the remainder of this paper.
5 At the social optimum, if one also assumes that the probability of joining the HMO are linear in m s . Note that if -s = 0, then the plan should always raise the shadow price and undersupply relative to FFS.
The second term inside the large brackets is ρ m s Π , the contemporaneous correlation between consumers expected spending on service s and total profits. This is what we identify as "predictiveness" in this paper. For most services we expect this correlation to be negative, since higher spending on a service will tend to be associated with lower profits. If there is no risk adjustment, so that r i = r for all ri, and spending on service s is uncorrelated with spending on all other medical services, then
This turns out to be an important threshold level of correlation: services whose prediction is more negatively correlated with profitability than is implied by the fact that they themselves are costly will themselves tend to be more severely rationed than average. Those that are positively or less negatively correlated with profitability than average will be rationed less severely than the average. If the correlation with total profits is positive, then it is at least possible that the plan may overprovide relative to even the FFS levels.
The next term inside of the square brackets is the square root of the conventional R2, equivalent here to
, the ratio of the standard deviation of predicted spending to the standard deviation of actual spending. This corresponds to what we have defined as predictability, and is always non-negative. To the extent that services are unpredictable, and hence are not anticipated by the consumer, then the plan will have an incentive to underprovide them. If services are more predictable, then this magnifies the incentive for the plan to use them for selection. The fourth term inside of large brackets is the coefficient of variation. Ceteris paribus, plans will have a greater incentive to ration services that are more variable across consumers. The standard deviation of profits is a constant for all services, and the ratio of the elasticities of expected and actual medical services with respect to the shadow price is plausibly assumed to be equal to one.
Although our model is too general to prove specific propositions, the following three propositions follow naturally from our analysis.
Proposition 2. Those services that are the most predictable are subject to the greatest incentive for service level distortion.
Proposition 3. The plan's belief about the magnitude of the correlation between expected service use and the plan's prediction about individual profitability determines whether a plan will try to "overprovide" or "underprovide" a given service.
The first proposition combines two important observations. If the concern is service-level distortion, then predictions of disaggregated spending on certain services matter, not simply predictions of total spending.
Moreover, it is not the econometrician's predictions that matter, but rather it is the plans beliefs about the consumer's beliefs. It is of course the plan that sets service quality. In this paper we do not attempt to distinguish empirically between the econometrician, plan and consumer beliefs about spending; however, we do examine the role that different types of information play in affecting selection incentives.
The second proposition highlights that there is no reason for a health plan to attempt to selectively distort a health care service if consumers are unable to predict their use of that service. Moreover, it is not the predictability of the service by consumers per se that matters, but rather it is again a plan's belief about what the consumer predicts that will determine a plan's actions.
The third proposition points out that health plans will have an incentive to distort services in a particular way, overproviding those that attract profitable enrollees, and underproviding those that would attract unprofitable enrollees. Note that who is profitable and who is unprofitable does not coincide with simply who is low cost and who is high cost. Risk adjustment payment formulas may make certain high cost people profitable, in which case it is the profitability within a payment category that matters. Also note that it is once again plan beliefs about the correlations that matter. Table 1 summarizes the implications of our three propositions for adverse selection incentives.
Predictability of spending at the service level is a necessary condition for there to be an incentive for plans to distort services. The predictiveness of a service is unimportant if the service is unpredictable.
Among services that are at least somewhat predictable, health plans have an incentive to overprovide services that are negatively correlated with contemporaneous total spending, and underprovide services that are positively correlated. There is no particular incentive to under or overprovide services that have zero correlation with total spending.
In table 1, we have dichotomized predictability as a yes-no variable. In reality predictability is a continuous variable, with services varying in the degree to which they can be predicted. Empirically we use the ordinary R 2 as our measure of predictability. In almost all of our models, the R 2 is statistically significantly different from zero, even when it is very small. To focus attention, and because it provides a natural benchmark, we pay particular attention to those services that are more predictable than the total health care spending using the same information set.
An important empirical question is how to divide up spending into separate categories to evaluate selection incentives. Conceptually, what one would like to partition spending along the lines of dimensions that health plans use to influence service provision. HMOs get to choose fees or discounts for each procedure, which suggests that groups of procedures, such as those classified by type of service, may be relevant. Health plans also contract selectively with different providers, and can potentially use provider specialty or place of service for selection. Finally, HMOs may be able to selectively manage the care of enrollees according to their diagnoses, in which case spending by diagnosis may be relevant. We can see arguments for using any or all of these partitions: spending by diagnosis, spending by provider specialty, spending by type of service, and spending by place of service. Therefore, in our empirical work we explore each of these dimensions both to understand which are most predictive and predictable, and also to understand which partitions provide the most powerful set of information for consumers to use for spending prediction and plan selection.
FGM and the preceding model have emphasized that it is plan beliefs and plan beliefs about consumer predictions that drive risk selection. Unfortunately we have no information about what information these two sets of agents use for predictions. Inferring such beliefs from actions that consumers and providers take is an important area for future research. For this paper, we perform a less ambitious analysis and simply explore various possible information sets for their predictive power. Implicit in our work is the assumption that consumers and plans both have the same information and use it to form predictions in the same way. We can provide no support for whether this is a correct assumption. We return to discussing the implications of consumer information and beliefs in the final discussion section.
Data
We Legal values of Gender (male/female) These selection criteria ensure that there is a full year of Part A and Part B utilization information for 1996, and some coverage to be predicted in 1997. 9 These sample selection differ from some that have been used in recent Medicare modeling efforts by Pope et al (2000a) in that we did not exclude either those in hospices, or those who are working aged beneficiaries. 10 For Medicare inpatient facility charges, which are paid primarily under using Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), there is no variable equivalent to covered charges, so we used total charges adjusted by the ratio of aggregate payment to aggregate charges. This adjustment better brings total hospital charges in line with the average Medicare payments, as others have done more precisely using hospital cost to charge ratios. summed up to total spending, we also labeled the various Part A categories as "provider specialties".
Hence hospitals room and board, hospice, and home health care are also considered "provider specialties." Since the Part A provider specialty categories are the same as the TOS categories, we present here only the 29 physician based physician specialty (PS) categories which attempted to aggregate these categories into clinically related specialties as much as possible. We also created sums of spending by 32 places of service (POS). Since on the whole these overlap considerably with the type of service and the place of service categories, and have somewhat less predictive power than either of these other two, we do not present our full decomposition of these values here.
Our final partitioning of total spending was by diagnostic categories. Unlike the other breakdowns, many claims have multiple diagnoses on them, and many have none. We chose to assign spending to the first listed diagnosis on each claim, which is often called the primary diagnosis. On hospital discharge records, the first listed diagnosis is has a special significance as the Principal diagnosis. Diagnoses are missing on many claims, particularly on Part A claims, hence all such claims were aggregated into an other category for "invalid or no diagnosis recorded." The large number of diagnostic codes were aggregated into condition categories using the Diagnostic Cost Group Condition Categories (CCs), which assigns each diagnosis to one of 184 condition categories, as described in Pope et al (2000) . We used DxCG software release 6.01 for our classification system. In addition to these detailed spending CC categories, we also aggregated spending to the level of 30 Aggregated Condition Categories (ACCs).
We examine the predictiveness of our four spending models for three different payment models. The first payment framework is no risk adjustment. For this, we calculate the simple Pearson correlation between spending on each service category (by TOS, PS, POS, and CC) and deviations from a single grand mean.
For the second payment framework, we used only age and sex, and hence calculate profit deviations from the mean rate for each of 22 age*sex categories.
11 The final payment model evaluated is an "All Encounter HCC model" that uses all of the HCCs defined using diagnoses on all encounters involving clinician providers.
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As previously noted, we included in our sample only people with a full 12 months of eligibility in 1996, and at least one month of eligibility for Medicare FFS in 1997. To adjust for variations in the number of 11 These are the same 22 age-sex categories used in Pope et al. (2000) for Medicare risk adjustment, and use dummies for each gender for approximately ten-year age increments for disabled beneficiaries, and five-year increments for aged beneficiaries. 12 CMS intends to use a simplified DCG/HCC model for payment of Medicare+Choice Health plans starting in January 2004. The simplified CMS model will most likely only use about half as many HCCs as are used in the present model, and will use payments rather than covered charges as the dependent variable. Hence the payment model evaluated in this paper differs substantially from what CMS has announced it will implement. months each individual is eligible, we use a technique that has been widely used to generate unbiased and more efficient regression predictions (Ellis and Ash, 1995; Greenwald et al, 2000 , Pope et al, 2000 .
Namely, we annualize total covered charges (spending) by dividing actual spending in 1997 by the fraction of the year each person was eligible, and then we weighted each observation by the fraction of the year eligible. All of the regression results and correlations that we present are weighted sample statistics with Year 2 spending amounts annualized in this way.
Empirical Results

Predictive power of different information sets for total spending
The first thing we examined was the predictive power of each of our different partitions of total spending.
We see this analysis as contributing to an understanding of which types of information consumer and health plans may potentially use to be most successful at predicting subsequent year spending, but we do not claim that plans or individuals actually use this information to make predictions. Predictive power for this analysis was the conventional R 2 from a linear regression models using lagged spending variables as the independent variables. Results from using our spending variable models, together with comparison results using only age sex and using the diagnosis only DCG/HCC model are also shown in Table 2 .
As others have found using Medicare samples, (Pope et al, 2000) age and sex only explain about 1 percent of the variability across individuals. Using 185 diagnostic dummy variables for the diseases a person has together with age and sex dummies does substantially better, explaining 10.43 percent of the variation in total covered charges in our sample. 13 These two regression models -the age sex model and the diagnoses organized by DCG/HCC are the two "risk adjustment" models we evaluate later.
Lagged total covered charges alone explain 5.4 percent of the total variation in 1997 annualized spending.
Among the four ways of decomposing total spending, it is interesting that breaking down spending according to the diseases (DCG/CCs) people have has the lowest predictive power (R2 = .0985) versus an R2 of .1499 for spending by type of service (TOS). At the bottom of Table 2 , it shows that there is enormous overlap in the information contained in all of these different spending decompositions. The R2 when all four sets of spending variables are included in the regression model only increases to .1543, and some of this apparent increase is most likely due to overfitting and would not be validated using split 13 For comparison, Pope, et al, (2002b) achieve an R 2 using data from the same two-year period of .112, but using payments rather than covered charges as their dependent variable. sample techniques. When diagnostic information is added in, the R2 for this significantly overfit model rises to .1685.
We conclude from this regression analysis of aggregate spending that there is considerable amount of predictive power in using disaggregated rather than aggregated spending variables, and that spending by TOS is marginally more predictive of subsequent year spending than other partitions of total spending.
Note that we believe that it is predictiveness of contemporary rather than subsequent year spending that should really drive selection incentives, however it is nonetheless interesting and important to note that plans and individuals will be most successful in using spending by TOS as their information set when making forecasts of total spending.
Results by Type of Service (TOS).
We next examined the predictability and contemporary predictiveness spending for individual 32 TOS categories, based on the Berenson/Eggers classification discussed earlier. Table 3 summarizes our key findings, and is organized in the same manner as each of the next four tables. Each row in this table corresponds to a different spending category, in this case a TOS, and weighted sample means are shown in the first column of numbers. The second column shows the predictability of each TOS spending group, calculated as the R2 from regressions for each type of service using the full array of 32 lagged TOS spending variables as explanatory variables. Note that lagged TOS spending information provides the best predictors of subsequent year TOS spending, a pattern that holds for each of the spending decompositions. The rows in Table 3 are sorted by Predictability; with an interesting finding being that Part A spending on hospice care is the most highly predictable of any TOS we examined.
14 Spending on 11 categories of TOS are all more predictable than total spending, with Part B spending on Durable Medical Equipment, Part A home health care, and Part B office visits being among the most predictable.
Our conceptual model identifies these as also being most vulnerable to over or underprovision.
The remaining three columns of The information in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 is also presented graphically in Figure 1 . The horizontal axis presents the predictability of each TOS, while the vertical axis presents the predictiveness for each TOS category. Figure 1 is for the case of no risk adjustment. It can be seen visually that overall there is a negative relationship between predictability and predictiveness. Many of the TOS categories that are the most highly predictable have relatively low predictiveness, with home health care spending and DME being the most vulnerable to service underprovision. Spending on eye procedures is nether predictable nor predictive of total spending, which seems plausible given that expensive eye procedures would rarely be done on persons with other major illnesses, and are usually not repeated in multiple years.
The final three columns of Table 3 Figure 2 (and the corresponding appendix Figure A -2 for DCG/HCC RA) repeat the analysis using spending by physician specialty rather than type of service. The strongest set of predictors for predicting spending by PS is lagged spending by PS, hence we use this information set to calculate the predictability measures. The most highly predictable spending category is laboratory, followed by psychiatry and then urology. All of these, with modest predictiveness, are vulnerable to service underprovision so as to selectively attract people who do not use these services. Spending on the provider specialty of primary care services is both predictable and relatively highly predictive, which also makes it vulnerable. Chiropractic care is interesting in that it is relatively predictable R2 = .229 and slightly negatively correlated with contemporaneous total spending ( -.011, p < .0001). Our conceptual model suggests that it would be an attractive service for an HMO to oversupply in that people who use this service have (slightly) lower average spending on total health care.
Results by Provider Specialty (PS)
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Results by DCG Condition Categories (DCG/CCs)
Results using diagnoses and summing up spending by detailed Condition Categories (CCs) from the DCG risk adjustment classification system are presented in Table 5 and 
Results by Aggregated Condition Categories (ACCs)
Results using diagnoses and summing up spending by Aggregated Condition Categories (ACCs) from the DxCG risk adjustment system are presented in Table 6 and Figure 4 . Rather than sorting them by predictive power, we have left them sorted by ACC to see illustrate how the classification system is organized. As can be seen, the ACC diagnosis groups correspond to broad body parts and organ systems.
The information set we used for prediction here was spending by detailed DCG/CCs. The striking results here is that spending on these more aggregated conditions has very low predictability: none of the spending categories by ACC are as predictable as total covered spending. The Mental ACC comes the closest to being predictable as we define it. Several ACCs have relatively high levels of predictiveness.
Discussion
We have used a simple framework to identify a set of types of services, provider specialties, and diagnosis-based condition categories that are relatively predictable, and hence subject to over or underprovision so as to encourage favorable selection. The most striking pattern is that the various mental conditions, whether identified by provider specialty (psychiatric) or diagnoses (personality disorders, schizophrenia and personality disorders) are both highly predictable and relatively highly predictive. In our framework, this makes them vulnerable to underprovision. At the other end of the spectrum, we find "Chiropractic" and "Other dermatological care" to be predictable and (slightly) negatively correlated with total spending, making them candidates for overprovision.
These results are consistent with the findings of Frank Glazer and McGuire (2002) who also found mental health services as being vulnerable to underprovision using a different sample and statistical approach.
They are also consistent with the services identified in Cao and McGuire (2002) which looked at switchers into and out of HMOS to identify services that were more or less vulnerable to service level distortion. Together with these earlier analyses, we have added to the growing literature that identifies sets of services that are most vulnerable to distortion in order to influence service selection.
reverse the negative correlation we observe given existing FFS coverage, which is quite limited. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Predictiveness
Notes: last three columns show contemporaneous correlations between total spending and spending by ACC of primary diagnosis Sample contains only those eligible for all of 1996, and Part A and B eligible for at least part of 1997. ACCs are groupings of diagnoses based on the DCG system as described in Pope et al. 2000 . Spending was assigned to the first diagnosis on each claim.
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Notes: last three columns show contemporaneous correlations between total spending and spending by ACC of primary diagnosis 
